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RECENT LEGISLATION 
]. Rodney Johnson"' 
The 1972 session of the General Assembly was especially active in the 
areas of wills, trusts, and estates. Much of this legislation deals with fine 
points not affecting the average lawyer in his practice. However, the follow-
ing items of legislation should be of general interest to the attorney whose 
practice involves probate work or estate planning, even though he does not 
hold himself out as a specialist in these areas. 
THE DISCLAIMER ACT 
First, one should note a very valuable post-mortem estate planning tool 
now available-the Disclaimer Act, which will appear as Sections 64.1-188 
through 64.1-196 of the Code. Though this act is technical, mastery of it 
will not require an inordinate amount of time, and potential benefits can 
accrue in the form of substantial gift tax savings. Although the federal 
estate and gift taxes are excise taxes imposed on the transfer of property, 
one can now, in certain cases, make what for all practical purposes is a 
transfer of property but which will not be construed as a "transfer" for 
federal estate or gift tax purposes. The key language, found in Internal 
Revenue Regulation 25.2511-l(c), provides: 
[w]here the law governing the administration of the decedent's estate 
gives a beneficiary, heir, or next-of-kin a right to completely and un-
qualifiedly refuse to accept ownership of property transferred from 
a decedent, a refusal to accept ownership does not constitute the 
making of a gift if the refusal is made within a reasonable time. 
Presently, the law in every state permits a beneficiary under a will to re-
nounce his gift. However, the common law did not recognize the possibility 
of renouncing an intestate share in a decedent's estate, since the inheritanc~ 
was seen to vest by operation of law immediately upon the death of tht? 
ancestor. Thus a purported "renunciation" would take effect as a transfer 
from the one renouncing to the ultimate taker. While this two-stage transfe~ 
has caused no real problems in the actual passage of the property, it has 
resulted in the payment of an extra tax. This problem is now a matter of 
•The Review acknowledges this contribution of Professor J. Rodney Johnson. Pro-
fessor Johnson also has an article on the abolition of dower in the Articles section of 
this issue. The comments here are taken from the text of Professor Johnson's presen-
tation on Law Day 1972. 
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history because the Act provides for· renunciation of testate, intestate, and 
inter vivos gifts. 
How can one make practical use of the Disclaimer Act? First, one should 
note that the Act takes the lapse approach, treating a disclaimer as if the 
disc;:laimant.had predeceased the decedent. Thus,.in cases of intestacy the 
ultimate takers will be determined by general intestate succession law, Code. 
§ 64.1-1. In testate cases, one would look first to any controlling provision 
in the will, then the anti-lapse statute, Code § 64.1-65, then the residuary 
clause, and finally back to Code§ 64.1-1. 
Case 1. Suppose a beneficiary decides that he has no need for a bequest 
and gives it to his children. He has made a taxable gift, and should he die 
within three years thereafter it will be presumed to have been a gift in con-
templation of death, includible in his gross estate for estate tax purposes 
unless ·the presumption can be rebutted. If, instead of accepting the bequest 
and giving it to his children, he disclaims it, the bequest would pass to his 
issue as intended with no possible gift or estate tax consequences on his part. 
Similarly, if there should be an inheritance instead of a bequest, the dis-
claimed inheritance would pass to the disclaimant's descendants with no tax 
consequences on his part. 
Case 2. Suppose that a husband, mindful of his obligation to his wife, and 
desiring to aid his alma mater, leaves half of his adjusted gross estate to his 
wife outright, gives her a life estate in the other half, and leaves the re-
mainder to the school on her death. The husband's estate will not pay any 
tax on the half given outright to the wife because of the marital deduction, 
but it will pay a tax in connection with the other half. However, due to 
the altered circumstances existing at the time of the husband's death (age of 
the wife, §ize of estate, etc.), perhaps the wife does not need the life estate 
in the second half. If she disclaims the life estate, then the entire second 
half will go to charity and no taxes will be payable by the husband's estate. 
Case 3. The husband dies intestate survived by his wife and two adult 
children who have no children. Assume that the husband leaves a $300,000 
estate equally consisting of realty and personalty, and that his wife is 60 
years old at his death. The wife will receive one-third of the personalty and 
dower in the realty. This is substantially less than the maximum marital 
deduction. However the two adult children can disclaim a part of their 
inheritance, which will then pass to the deceased's wife, with a consequent 
swelling of the marital deduction and lowering of the tax burden on the 
estate by approximately $22,500. Were the estate half this size, the estate 
tax savings would remain in excess of $6,500. 
While space limitations prevent a discussion of the many possible uses of 
this act, one should realize that it permits the personal representative of a 
decedent to disclaim, and that it requires that the disclaimer be made within 
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ten months. of death (delivery in inter vivas cases), or vesting, if that be 
later. Draftsmen of spendthrift trusts should be aware of one caveat. As 
the beneficiary of a spendthrift provision expressly has the right to-disclaim, 
one must provide for some kind of gift over on disclaiming to pr.event the 
spendthrift beneficiary from defeating the intention of the transferor. 
UNIFORM GIFT TO MINORS ACT 
Many attorneys often provide for contingent trusts in wills when in fact 
they do not desire to do so. For instance, assume a young married couple 
with several children and an estate of $20,000. They want a typical disposi-
tion-all to the surviving spouse then all to the children. What. happens if 
both parents die before the children attain the age of majority? Who will 
manage the children's property for them? If. no provision has been made, 
the court will appoint a guardian, the worst possible manner in most cases 
to manage a minor's property. Thus, one has no alternative but to provide 
a contingent testamentary· trust for the minor children. While this is 
preferable to a guardianship, it can involve annual accountings, filing of 
fiduciary tax returns, court approval of termination, possible construction 
proceedings, fiduciary bonds, and the unlimited throwback rule of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969. Although the expense of these incidents isn't grossly 
oppressive, relative to a large trust, such fixed expenses can be extremely 
burdensome to a small trust, because they consume a disproportionate 
amount of the income. 
Code § 31-27(d), an addition to the Uniform Gift to Minors Act 
(UGMA), gives relief by providing that a testator or settlor may authorize 
his fiduciary to make distribution for a minor to a custodian for the minor 
under the UGMA. The custodian will have sufficient discretion and flexi-
bility under the UGMA to make whatever distributions are desirable for 
the benefit of the children during their minority, and the trust expenses 
mentioned above could be eliminated, leaving more funds to be used for the 
children's benefit. Appropriately, one should note here that while an infant 
attains his majority at age 18 for most purposes, he attains it at 21 for 
purposes of the UGMA. 
INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE 
In drafting a will or trust agreement, one must enumerate certain 
powers that he wishes his fiduciary to have. Increasingly, lawyers in Vir-
ginia are working with Code § 64.1-57 which provides for the incorporation 
by reference of certain powers of fiduciaries into wills or trust instruments. 
This section contains nineteen clauses of well-designed boilerplate waiting 
for incorporation. Paragraph (p) of this section has been amended by the 
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addition of new sub-paragraph ( 4) that empowers the .fiduciary to dis-
tribute to a minor under the UGMA. Thus it is possible to use the UGMA 
directly as previously mentioned, or indirectly by incorporating the statu-
tory boilerplate that gives the .fiduciary the discretion to make this form of 
distribution should he think it advisable. 
Code § 64.1-57 has been amended also by the addition of a new para-
graph ( c) ( 1) that gives the fiduciary discretion to invest the assets in 
mutual funds or investment trusts, and permits him to change investments 
from realty to personalty and vice versa. 
· A final amendment to Code § 64.1-57, expressly stated to be declaratory 
of existing law, provides that the section may be made applicable to de-
cedent's estates as well as trusts. 
SELF-PROVING WILL 
One familiar incident of probating a will is locating the attesting wit-
nesses and arranging for them to accompany the executor to the clerk's 
office to prove the will. This time-consuming and cumbersome ritual can 
be avoided now by utilizing Code § 64.1-87.1, which provides for a self-
proving will. This section sets out the form of an affidavit that contains the 
facts that the witnesses would be required to testify to in court to prove the 
will. If the testator acknowledges his will and the witnesses execute this 
affidavit, all before an official authorized to administer oaths, either at the 
time the will is executed or later, then the witnesses' statement "shall be 
accepted by the court as if it had been taken ore tenus before such court." 
TOTIEN TRUSTS 
Code § 6.1-73, a new section, authorizes any bank or trust company to 
pay out deposits made in trust form to the named beneficiary on the death 
of the trustee, without the intervention of a guardian if ( 1) the institution 
has no notice of the trust terms, (2) the deposit doesn't exceed $5,000, and 
( 3) the beneficiary is 18 years of age or older. Those desiring to place 
more than $5,000 in a Totten Trust may utilize the rather obvious expedient 
of multiple accounts, or may establish an account in a savings and loan 
association, because existing Code § 6.1-149 doesn't contain any maximum 
balance limitation. 
AGE OF MAJORITY 
Code § 1-13.42(b), which best summarizes the net effect of the age of 
majority legislation, provides: 
[f]or the purposes of all laws of the Commonwealth including com-
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mon law, case law and statutory law, unless an exception is specifically 
provided in this Code, a person shall be an adult, shall be of full age 
and shall reach the age of majority when he becomes eighteen years of 
age. 
As previously noted, twenty-one remains the age of majority for purposes 
of the Uniform Gift to Minors Act which contains its own definitions of 
"adult" and "minor." 
SMALL FUNDS STATUTE 
Code§ 6.1-71, authorizing a bank or trust company to pay to the next of 
kin the balance a decedent had on hand at his death provided (1) 120 days 
have elapsed since the time of death, (2) no qualification is had on the 
estate, and (3) the balance in the account is $1,000 or less, has been amended 
to increase the amount to $2,500. A corresponding change in Code§ 6.1-153 
renders the same result for accounts in savings and loan associations. 
MISCELLANEOUS 
The filing deadline for the Virginia inheritance tax return is changed 
from four to nine months after the decedent's death. Code § 58-166. The 
time for payment of inheritance taxes is changed from twelve to nine months 
after the decedent's death. Code§ 58-176. 
The statement in lieu of settlement of accounts by a personal representa-
tive who is the sole distributee or sole beneficiary is enlarged to cover those 
cases where there are two personal representatives who are the only dis-
tributees or beneficiaries. Code§ 26-20.1. 
Stepchildren are now included in Class A for gift tax purposes. Code § 
58-219. 
Page two of the form required for reporting inventories to the commis-
sioners of accounts, dealing with "other property of the estate of which the 
fiduciary has knowledge," has been deleted. Code § 26-12.1. 
